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Abstract
What is information? Is it physical? We argue that in a Bayesian
theory the notion of information must be defined in terms of its effects on
the beliefs of rational agents. Information is whatever constrains rational
beliefs and therefore it is the force that induces us to change our minds.
This problem of updating from a prior to a posterior probability distribu-
tion is tackled through an eliminative induction process that singles out
the logarithmic relative entropy as the unique tool for inference. The re-
sulting method of Maximum relative Entropy (ME), which is designed for
updating from arbitrary priors given information in the form of arbitrary
constraints, includes as special cases both MaxEnt (which allows arbi-
trary constraints) and Bayes’ rule (which allows arbitrary priors). Thus,
ME unifies the two themes of these workshops – the Maximum Entropy
and the Bayesian methods – into a single general inference scheme that
allows us to handle problems that lie beyond the reach of either of the
two methods separately. I conclude with a couple of simple illustrative
examples.
1 Introduction
The general problem of inductive inference is to update from a prior probability
distribution to a posterior distribution when new information becomes available.
This raises several basic questions which are the subject of this paper. First,
what is information? It is clear that data “contains” or “conveys” information,
but what does this precisely mean? Is information some sort of physical fluid
that can be contained or transported? Is information physical? Can we measure
amounts of information? Do we need to? What is entropy?
A second set of questions revolves around our methods to process informa-
tion. We know that Bayes’ rule is the natural way to update probabilities when
the new information is in the form of data and we know that Jaynes’ method
of maximum entropy, MaxEnt, is designed to handle information in the form
of constraints [1]. At first sight these two methods appear unrelated. Are they
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compatible with each other? Are there other methods? Moreover, the range
of applicability of either method is somewhat limited: Bayes’ rule can handle
arbitrary priors and data, and it can even handle some constraints, but not arbi-
trary constraints. On the other hand, MaxEnt can handle arbitrary constraints
even data, but not arbitrary priors. Can we extend these methods?
As discussed in [2] the Shannon-Jaynes interpretation of entropy as a mea-
sure of uncertainty or of amount of information is somewhat problematic. The
issue is not purely academic because the way equations are set up to solve a
problem and even the kind of problems that we are willing to consider are af-
fected by the particular meaning attributed to quantities such as entropy or
probability. The Shannon-Jaynes interpretation was fairly adequate for their
purposes, namely, communication theory and statistical mechanics, but it is
not at all clear that their entropy with its attendant interpretation was the
appropriate tool for the very different problem of updating probabilities.
The important contribution of Shore and Johnson [3] was the realization that
any confusion surrounding the meaning of entropy could be, if not resolved, at
least evaded by directly axiomatizing the procedure for updating probabilities
instead of seeking dubious measures for a vaguely defined notion of information.
Their argument, which is based on demanding consistency – if a problem can
be solved in two different ways the two solutions must agree – is fundamen-
tally sound. However, the detailed assumptions in their derivation have been
criticized in [4, 5].
Another approach to entropy was proposed by Skilling [6]. Although his ax-
ioms were clearly inspired by Shore and Johnson, the method was very different
in two respects. First, Skilling was not directly concerned with the problem
of updating probabilities; his method was designed for the determination of
positive-additive functions such as intensities in an image. In retrospect we see
that the application to this particular problem was quite unfortunate because
when the method failed to produce good image reconstructions the natural re-
action was a widespread loss of confidence about entropy methods in general.
The second difference, which I think is a truly significant contribution, is
that Skilling’s approach is a systematic method for induction. He spelled out
in full detail how to construct a general theory from known special cases. The
fundamental inductive principle is deceptively trivial: ‘If a general theory exists
it must apply to special cases’. The basic idea is that when there exists a special
case that happens to be known all candidate theories that fail to reproduce it
must be discarded. Thus, the known special cases – called the axioms of the
theory – constrain the form of the general theory, and the idea is that a sufficient
number of such constraints will determine the general theory completely. Of
course, there is always the unfortunate possibility that the desired general theory
does not exist, but if it does, then the search can be conducted in a systematic
and orderly way.
Philosophers already had a name for such a method: they called it elimina-
tive induction [7]. On the negative side, eliminative induction, like any other
form of induction, is not guaranteed to work. It failed, for example, in Skilling’s
image reconstruction problem. On the positive side, eliminative induction adds
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an interesting twist to Popper’s scientific methodology. According to Popper
scientific theories can never be proved right, they can only be proved false; a
theory is corroborated only to the extent that all attempts at falsifying it have
failed. Eliminative induction is fully compatible with Popper’s notions but the
point of view is just the opposite. Instead of focusing on failure to falsify one
focuses on success : it is the successful falsification of all rival theories that cor-
roborates the surviving one. The advantage is that one acquires a more explicit
understanding of why competing theories are eliminated.
The present paper is the third in a sequence devoted to clarifying the use of
relative entropy as a tool for processing information and updating probabilities
[2, 8]. In [2] we applied Skilling’s method to the problem of Shore and Johnson.
The answer to the question ‘What is entropy?’ turns out to be trivial and
somewhat surprising: entropy needs no interpretation. We do not need to know
what ‘entropy’ means, we only need to know how to use it. This explains why
the “correct” interpretation had been so elusive – there is none. In [2] and then
again in [8] the special cases, the axioms, were increasingly polished to clarify
how alternative entropies are ruled out. Furthermore, in [2] we also discussed
the question, central to any general method of updating, of the extent to which
the distribution of maximum entropy is to be preferred over all others, the extent
to which distributions with entropies less than the maximum are to be ruled
out.
In this paper we review how eliminative induction leads to a unique candi-
date for a general theory of inference, the method of Maximum relative Entropy
(ME), which is designed for updating from arbitrary priors given information in
the form of arbitrary constraints. The three axioms used in [8] – locality, coor-
dinate invariance, and consistency for independent subsystems – are sufficient
to single out the logarithmic relative entropy as the unique tool for updating.
In particular, we wish to elaborate further on the use of the third axiom – con-
sistency for independent subsystems – to eliminate alternative entropies [12].
The idea is rather simple. The known special cases covered under axiom
3 also include situations in which we have a large number N of independent
identical systems where all sorts of inferences can be reliably carried out using
various asymptotic techniques (laws of large numbers, large deviation theory,
etc.). The close connection with the method of maximum entropy has been
repeatedly emphasized by several authors [9]-[11]. We conclude that the loga-
rithmic relative entropy is the only candidate for a general method for updating
probabilities. Alternative entropies can be useful for other purposes – for ex-
ample, when studying the information geometry of statistical manifolds – but
not for a general theory of updating.
In [8] we showed that the ME method includes both MaxEnt and Bayes’
rule as special cases and therefore it unifies the two dominant themes of these
workshops – the Maximum Entropy and Bayesianmethods – into a single general
inference scheme that allows us to handle problems that lie beyond the reach
of either of the two methods separately. I conclude with a couple of simple
illustrative examples.
In a companion paper [13] we discuss the problem of multiple constraints.
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Should the constraints be processed simultaneously or sequentially and, if so,
in what order? There we also give an explicit example in which ME is used to
simultaneously process information in the form of data and moment constraints.
2 What is information?
It is not unusual these days to hear that systems “carry” or “contain” informa-
tion and that “information is physical”. This mode of expression can perhaps
be traced to the origins of information theory in Shannon’s theory of communi-
cation. We say that we have received information when among the vast variety
of messages that could conceivably have been generated by a distant source, we
discover which particular message was actually sent. It is thus that the message
“carries” information. The analogy with physics is straightforward: the set of
all possible states of a physical system can be likened to the set of all possible
messages, and the actual state of the system corresponds to the message that
was actually sent. Thus, the system “conveys” a message: the system “carries”
information about its own state. Sometimes the message might be difficult to
read, but it is there nonetheless.
This language – information is physical – useful as it has turned out to be,
does not exhaust the meaning of the word ‘information’. The goal of informa-
tion theory, or better, communication theory, is to characterize the sources of
information, to measure the capacity of the communication channels, and to
learn how to control the degrading effects of noise. It is somewhat ironic but
nevertheless true that this “information” theory is unconcerned with the cen-
tral Bayesian issue of how the message affects the beliefs of a rational agent. A
fully Bayesian information theory demands an explicit account of the relation
between information and beliefs.
Our desire to update from one state of belief to another is driven by the
conviction that not all probability assignments are equally good. One can argue
that what makes one probability assignment better than another is that it better
reflects some objective feature of the world, that it provides a better guide to
the “truth” – whatever this might mean. The updating mechanism is supposed
to allow us to incorporate information about the world into our beliefs.
The implication is that when confronted with new information our choices
as to what we are honestly and rationally allowed to believe should become
correspondingly restricted. This, I propose, is the defining characteristic of
information: Information is whatever constrains rational beliefs. An important
aspect of this notion is that for a rational agent the updating is not optional;
it is a moral imperative. Information is whatever forces a change of rational
beliefs.
Our definition captures an idea of information that is directly related to
changing our minds: information is the driving force behind the process of
learning. Note also that although there is no need to talk about amounts of
information, whether measured in units of bits or otherwise, our notion of in-
formation allows precise quantitative calculations. Indeed, by information in its
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most general form, we mean the set of constraints on the family of acceptable
posterior distributions and this is precisely the kind of information the method
of maximum entropy has been designed to handle.
It may be worthwhile to point out an analogy with Newtonian dynamics.
The state of motion of a system is described in terms of momentum – the
“quantity” of motion – while the change from one state to another is explained
in terms of an applied force. Similarly, in Bayesian inference a state of belief is
described in terms of probabilities – the “quantity” of belief – and the change
from one state to another is due to information. Just as a force is defined as
that which induces a change in motion, so information is that which induces a
change of beliefs.
3 Updating probabilities: the ME method
Consider a variable x which can be discrete or continuous, in one or several
dimensions. The uncertainty about x is described by a probability distribution
q(x). Our goal is to update from the prior distribution q(x) to a posterior dis-
tribution P (x) when new information – that is, constraints – becomes available.
The constraints could be given in terms of expected values but this is not nec-
essary. The question is: of all those distributions p(x) within the family defined
by the constraints, which do we select?
As suggested by Skilling [6] to select the posterior it seems reasonable to
rank the candidate distributions in order of increasing preference. It is clear
that to accomplish this goal the ranking must be transitive: if distribution p1 is
preferred over distribution p2, and p2 is preferred over p3, then p1 is preferred
over p3. Such transitive rankings are represented by assigning to each p(x) a
real number S[p], which we will henceforth call entropy, in such a way that if
p1 is preferred over p2, then S[p1] > S[p2]. The selected distribution P (one or
possibly many, for on the basis of the available information there may be several
equally preferred distributions) will be that which maximizes the entropy S[p].
We are thus led to a method of Maximum Entropy (ME) that is a variational
method involving entropies which are real numbers. These features are imposed
on purpose; they are dictated by the function that the ME method is designed
to perform.
Next, to define the ranking scheme, we must decide on the functional form
of S[p]. First, the purpose of the method is to update from priors to posteri-
ors. The ranking scheme must depend on the particular prior q and therefore
the entropy S must be a functional of both p and q. Thus the entropy S[p, q]
produces a ranking of the distributions p relative to the given prior q: S[p, q]
is the entropy of p relative to q. Accordingly S[p, q] is commonly called rela-
tive entropy. Since all entropies are relative, even when relative to a uniform
distribution, the modifier ‘relative’ is redundant and will be dropped.
Second, since we deal with incomplete information the method, by its very
nature, cannot be deductive: the method must be inductive. The best we can do
is use those special cases where we know what the preferred distribution should
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be to eliminate those entropy functionals S[p, q] that fail to provide the right
update. The known special cases will be called (perhaps inappropriately) the
axioms of the theory. They play a crucial role: they define what makes one
distribution preferable over another.
The three axioms below are chosen to reflect the conviction that information
collected in the past and codified into the prior distribution is very valuable and
should not be frivolously discarded. This attitude is maximally conservative:
the only aspects of one’s beliefs that should be updated are those for which
new evidence has been supplied. Furthermore, since the axioms do not tell us
what and how to update, they merely tell us what not to update, they have
the added bonus of maximizing objectivity – there are many ways to change
something but only one way to keep it the same. Thus, we adopt the
Principle of Minimal Updating (PMU): Beliefs should be updated only
to the extent required by the new information.
The three axioms, a brief motivation for them, and their consequences for the
functional form of the entropy are listed below; more details and proofs are
given in [2] and [8]. As will become immediately apparent the axioms do not
refer to merely three cases; any induction from such a weak foundation would
hardly be reliable. The reason the axioms are convincing and so constraining is
that they refer to three infinitely large classes of known special cases.
Axiom 1: Locality. Local information has local effects.
Suppose the information to be processed does not refer to a particular subdo-
main D of the space X of x’s. In the absence of any new information about
D the PMU demands we do not change our minds about D. Thus, we design
the inference method so that q(x|D), the prior probability of x conditional on
x ∈ D, is not updated. The selected conditional posterior is P (x|D) = q(x|D).
The consequence of axiom 1 is that non-overlapping domains of x contribute
additively to the entropy. Dropping additive terms and multiplicative factors
that do not affect the overall ranking, the entropy functional can be simplified
to the form
S[p, q] =
∫
dxF (p(x), q(x), x) , (1)
where F is some unknown function.
Axiom 2: Coordinate invariance. The system of coordinates carries no
information.
The points x can be labeled using any of a variety of coordinate systems. One
can always change coordinates but this should not affect the ranking of the
distributions. The consequence of axiom 2 is that S[p, q] can be written in
terms of coordinate invariants such as dxm(x) and p(x)/m(x), and q(x)/m(x):
S[p, q] =
∫
dxm(x)Φ
(
p(x)
m(x)
,
q(x)
m(x)
)
. (2)
(Again, additive terms and multiplicative factors that do not affect the overall
ranking have been dropped.) Thus the unknown function F which had three
arguments has been replaced by two unknown functions, one is a density m(x),
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and the other is a function Φ with two arguments. Next we determine the
density m(x) by invoking the locality axiom 1 once again.
Axiom 1 (special case): When there is no new information there is no
reason to change one’s mind.
When no new information is available the domain D in axiom 1 coincides with
the whole space X . The conditional probabilities q(x|D) = q(x|X ) = q(x)
should not be updated and the selected posterior distribution coincides with
the prior, P (x) = q(x). The consequence is that up to normalization m(x) must
be the prior distribution q(x), which restricts the entropy to functionals of the
form
S[p, q] =
∫
dx q(x)Φ
(
p(x)
q(x)
)
. (3)
Axiom 3: Consistency for independent subsystems. When a system
is composed of subsystems that are known to be independent it should not matter
whether the inference procedure treats them separately or jointly.
Suppose the information on two independent subsystems 1 and 2 is such that
the prior distributions q1(x1) and q2(x2) are respectively updated to P1(x1) and
P2(x2) when they are treated separately. When treated as a single system the
joint prior is q1(x1)q2(x2) and the family of potential posteriors is p(x1, x2) =
p1(x1)p2(x2). The entropy functional must be such that the selected posterior
is P1(x1)P2(x2). The consequence of axiom 3 for this particular case of just two
subsystems is that entropies are restricted to the one-parameter family given by
Sη[p, q] =
1
η(η + 1)
[
1−
∫
dx p(x)
(
p(x)
q(x)
)η]
. (4)
Once again, additive terms and multiplicative factors that do not affect the
overall ranking scheme can be freely chosen. The η = 0 case reproduces the
usual logarithmic relative entropy,
S[p, q] = −
∫
dx p(x) log
p(x)
q(x)
(5)
[Use yη = exp η log y ≈ 1 + η log y in eq.(4) and let η → 0 to get eq.(5).]
In [8] we argued that the index η has to be the same for all systems. To see
why consider any two independent systems characterized by η1 and η2. Consis-
tency between the joint and separate updates requires that η1 = η2 therefore
η must be a universal constant. From the success of statistical mechanics as a
theory of inference we inferred that the value of this constant must be η = 0
leading to the logarithmic entropy, eq.(5). Here we offer a different argument
also based on a broader application of axiom 3:
Axiom 3 (special case): Consistency for large numbers of indepen-
dent identical subsystems.
The known special cases covered under axiom 3 include situations in which we
have a large number N of independent identical systems. In such cases either
the weak law of large numbers or large deviation theory in the form of Sanov’s
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theorem are sufficient to make the desired inferences. Entropy considerations
are not needed.
Let the x variables be discrete xi with i = 1 . . .m. The identical priors for
the individual systems are qi and the available information is that the potential
posteriors pi are subject, for example, to an expectation value constraint such
as 〈a〉 = A, where A is some specified value and 〈a〉 =
∑
aipi.
Consider the set of N systems treated jointly. Let the number of systems
found in state i be ni, and let fi = ni/N be the corresponding frequency. In
the limit of large N the frequencies fi converge (in probability) to the desired
posterior Pi while the sample average a¯ =
∑
aifi converges (also in probabil-
ity) to the expected value 〈a〉 = A. The probability of a particular frequency
distribution f = {f1 . . . fn} generated by the prior q is multinomial,
QN (f |q) =
N !
n1! . . . nm!
qn11 . . . q
nm
m with
m∑
i=1
ni = N , (6)
and for large N we have
QN (f |q) ≈ expN(S[f, q] + rN ) , (7)
where S[f, q] given by eq.(5), and where rN is a correction that vanishes as
N → ∞. To find the most probable frequency distribution satisfying the con-
straint a¯ = A one maximizes QN (f |q) subject to a¯ = A, which is equivalent to
maximizing the entropy S[f, q] subject to a¯ = A. The corresponding problem
for the individual systems is that of maximizing Sη[p, q] subject to 〈a〉 = A. The
two procedures agree only when we choose η = 0. Therefore, entropies Sη with
η 6= 0 are not consistent with the laws of large numbers and must be discarded.
Csiszar [10] and Grendar [11] have argued that the asymptotic argument
above provides a valid justification for the ME method of updating. An agent
whose prior is q receives the information 〈a〉 = A which can be reasonably
interpreted as a sample average a¯ = A over a large ensemble of N trials. The
agent’s beliefs are updated so that the posterior P coincides with the most
probable f distribution. This is quite compelling but, of course, as a justification
of the ME method it is restricted to situations where it is natural to think in
terms of ensembles with large N . This justification is not nearly as compelling
for singular events for which large ensembles either do not exist or are too
unnatural and contrived. From our point of view the asymptotic argument
above does not by itself provide a fully convincing justification for the universal
validity of the ME method but it does provide considerable inductive support.
It serves as a valuable consistency check that must be passed by any inductive
inference procedure that claims to be of general applicability.
The results are summarized as follows:
The ME method: The objective is to update from a prior distribution q to
a posterior distribution given the information that the posterior lies within a
certain family of distributions p. The selected posterior P (x) is that which
maximizes the entropy S[p, q]. Since prior information is valuable the functional
S[p, q] has been chosen so that beliefs are updated only to the extent required by
the new information. No interpretation for S[p, q] is given and none is needed.
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4 Bayes’ rule and its generalizations
The problem is to update our beliefs about θ ∈ Θ (θ represents one or many pa-
rameters) on the basis of three pieces of information: (1) the prior information
codified into a prior distribution q(θ); (2) the data x ∈ X (obtained in one or
many experiments); and (3) the known relation between θ and x given by the
model as defined by the sampling distribution or likelihood, q(x|θ). The updat-
ing consists of replacing the prior probability distribution q(θ) by a posterior
distribution P (θ) that applies after the data has been processed.
The crucial element that will allow Bayes’ rule to be smoothly incorporated
into the ME scheme is the realization that before the data information is avail-
able not only we do not know θ, we do not know x either. Thus, the relevant
space for inference is not Θ but the product space Θ×X and the relevant joint
prior is q(x, θ) = q(θ)q(x|θ). We should emphasize that the information about
how x is related to θ is contained in the functional form of the distribution
q(x|θ) – for example, whether it is a Gaussian or a Cauchy distribution – and
not in the actual values of the arguments x and θ which are, at this point, still
unknown.
Next we collect data and the observed values turn out to be x′. We must
update to a posterior that lies within the family of distributions p(x, θ) that
reflect the fact that x is known,
p(x) =
∫
dθ p(θ, x) = δ(x− x′) . (8)
This data information constrains but is not sufficient to determine the joint
distribution
p(x, θ) = p(x)p(θ|x) = δ(x − x′)p(θ|x′) . (9)
Any choice of p(θ|x′) is in principle possible. Additional input is needed and
it is at this point that we invoke the Principle of Minimal Updating: beliefs
need to be revised only to the extent required by the data. Accordingly the
conditional prior q(θ|x′) requires no revision and the selected posterior P (x, θ)
is such that P (θ|x′) = q(θ|x′), or
P (x, θ) = δ(x − x′)q(θ|x′) . (10)
The corresponding marginal posterior probability P (θ) is
P (θ) =
∫
dxP (θ, x) = q(θ|x′) = q(θ)
q(x′|θ)
q(x′)
, (11)
which is recognized as Bayes’ rule. This is extremely reasonable: we maintain
those beliefs about θ that are consistent with the data values x′ that turned
out to be true. Data values that were not observed are discarded because they
are now known to be false. ‘Maintain’ is the key word: it reflects the PMU in
action.
Remark: Bayes’ rule is usually written in the form
q(θ|x′) = q(θ)
q(x′|θ)
q(x′)
, (12)
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and called Bayes’ theorem. This formula is very simple; perhaps it is too simple.
It is just a restatement of the product rule – valid for any x′ whether observed
or not – and therefore it is a simple consequence of the internal consistency of
the prior beliefs. The drawback of this formula is that the left hand side is not a
posterior but rather a prior (conditional) probability; it obscures the fact that
an additional principle – the PMU – was needed for updating.
Next we show that Bayes’ rule is consistent with, and indeed, is a special
case of the ME method [8]. This is not too surprising given that the ME is also
based on the PMU. According to the ME method the selected joint posterior
P (x, θ) is that which maximizes the entropy,
S[p, q] = −
∫
dxdθ p(x, θ) log
p(x, θ)
q(x, θ)
, (13)
subject to the appropriate constraints. Note that the information in the data,
eq.(8), represents an infinite number of constraints on the family p(x, θ): for each
value of x there is one constraint and one Lagrange multiplier λ(x). Maximizing
S, (13), subject to (8) and normalization,
δ
{
S + α
[∫
dxdθ p(x, θ)− 1
]
+
∫
dxλ(x)
[∫
dθ p(x, θ)− δ(x− x′)
]}
= 0 ,
(14)
yields the joint posterior,
P (x, θ) = q(x, θ)
eλ(x)
Z
, (15)
where Z is a normalization constant, and λ(x) is determined from (8),
∫
dθ q(x, θ)
eλ(x)
Z
= q(x)
eλ(x)
Z
= δ(x − x′) , (16)
so that the joint posterior is
P (x, θ) = q(x, θ)
δ(x− x′)
q(x)
= δ(x− x′)q(θ|x) , (17)
from which we recover Bayes’ rule, eq.(11).
I conclude with a couple of very simple examples that show how the ME al-
lows generalizations of Bayes’ rule. The background for these generalized Bayes
problems is the familiar one: We want to make inferences about some variables
θ on the basis of information about other variables x. As before, the prior in-
formation consists of our prior knowledge about θ given by the distribution q(θ)
and the relation between x and θ is given by the likelihood q(x|θ); thus, the
prior joint distribution q(x, θ) is known. But now the information about x is
much more limited.
Example 1.– The data is uncertain: x is not known. The marginal posterior
p(x) is no longer a sharp delta function but some other known distribution,
p(x) = PD(x). This is still an infinite number of constraints
p(x) =
∫
dθ p(θ, x) = PD(x) , (18)
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that are easily handled by ME. Maximizing S, (13), subject to (18) and nor-
malization, leads to
P (x, θ) = PD(x)q(θ|x) . (19)
The corresponding marginal posterior,
P (θ) =
∫
dxPD(x)q(θ|x) = q(θ)
∫
dxPD(x)
q(x|θ)
q(x)
, (20)
is known as Jeffrey’s rule.
Example 2.– Now we have even less information: p(x) is not known. All we
know about p(x) is an expected value
〈f〉 =
∫
dx p(x)f(x) = F . (21)
Maximizing S, (13), subject to (21) and normalization,
δ
{
S + α
[∫
dxdθ p(x, θ)− 1
]
+ λ
∫
dxdθ p(x, θ)f(x) − F
}
= 0 , (22)
yields the joint posterior,
P (x, θ) = q(x, θ)
eλf(x)
Z
, (23)
where the normalization constant Z and the multiplier λ are obtained from
Z =
∫
dx q(x)eλf(x) and
d logZ
dλ
= F . (24)
The corresponding marginal posterior is
P (θ) = q(θ)
∫
dx
eλf(x)
Z
q(x|θ) . (25)
The two posteriors (20) and (25) are sufficiently intuitive that one could have
written them down directly without deploying the full machinery of the ME
method, but they do serve to illustrate the essential compatibility of Bayesian
and Maximum Entropy methods. A less trivial example is given in [13].
5 Conclusions
Any Bayesian account of the notion of information cannot ignore the fact that
Bayesians are concerned with the beliefs of rational agents. The relation be-
tween information and beliefs must be clearly spelled out. The definition we
have proposed – that information is that which constrains rational beliefs and
therefore forces the agent to change its mind – is convenient for two reasons.
First, the information/belief relation very explicit, and second, the definition is
ideally suited for quantitative manipulation using the ME method.
The other main conclusion is that the logarithmic relative entropy is the only
candidate for a general method for updating probabilities – the ME method –
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which includes MaxEnt and Bayes’ rule as special cases; it unifies them into a
single theory of inductive inference.
It is true that there exist many different ways to define measures of sepa-
ration, or divergence between distributions and that these “entropies” can be
useful in a wide variety of ways. In fact, it was precisely this wealth of possi-
bilities that Shore and Johnson intended to avoid. These other “entropies” can
be useful for other purposes but not for updating; at least not for an updating
theory that strives to achieve universal applicability. Let us emphasize that the
reason the ME method uses the logarithmic entropy as the tool for updating is
not that this entropy has been shown to provide the correct measure of distance
– there are many other such measures. We do not even claim that inferences
on the basis of the ME method are guaranteed to be correct – this is induction;
there are no guarantees. It is just that all alternative entropies are much worse
because in known cases they give answers that are demonstrably wrong.
Acknowledgements: I would like to acknowledge valuable discussions with C.
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